251. Watch out 2033, the “Omega Point” of the Ecumenical Movement

February 1st, 2026

As expected, the highlight of the 1700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea was the ecumenical prayer on November 28 presided over by Pope Leo XIV at the ruins of the church of St. Neophytus in Nicaea (today the name of the town is Isnik), where the Council meetings were held in 325 AD.

The ceremony was sober, but the language used was solemn. Above all, the symbolic meaning of the event was charged with “historical” significance, not only because of the reference to the important anniversary, but above all in view of further steps in the ecumenical journey.

The point reached in that celebration had been long in preparation: it was a question of using the centenary of Nicaea to enhance the “common faith” expressed in the Nicene Creed and to consolidate the idea that all Christians are united because they recite the words of that ancient text together. From an ecumenical perspective, differences are seen, if anything, as subsequent interpretations of secondary aspects that do not undermine the common basis. The risk is clearly to exploit Nicaea and use it as a pretext for purposes other than a deeper understanding of its contents.

The question that was not asked (but its positive answer only assumed) is: In what sense the Nicene creed is the basis for ecumenism? The reality is that while different poeple can affirm – and even recite – the words of the Nicene Creed together (e.g. remission of sin, Mary, church), they mean different things according to their different theological frameworks and church’s allegiances.[1] Evangelicals want their faith to be not only loosley attached to Scripture, but under God’s Word and always open to be corrected by it.

Of course, on November 28 the Roman pope was symbolically at the center of the scene, the point of connection between everyone, flanked by the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew and other ecclesiastical dignitaries seated behind him in lesser roles. The only notable absentee was the Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, at odds with the “good” ecumenical world for his support of the Russian war against Ukraine.

In any case, it was a theatrical representation of contemporary ecumenism: all united around the successor of Peter, the Roman Pope, the only dressed in white.

That said, what happened in Nicaea is, on the one hand, a point of arrival, but on the other, it is only one step in the ecumenical trajectory. The direction was indicated by Pope Leo himself during the flight to Lebanon, the second stop on his first international trip.
 
Speaking to journalists, Pope Prevost said of the meeting in Nicaea with ecumenical leaders:
 
“Yesterday morning we spoke about possible meetings in the future. One would be in the year 2033, two thousand years after Redemption, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, which is obviously an event that all Christians would like to celebrate. The idea was well received. We have not yet made the invitation but there is a possibility of celebrating this great event of the Resurrection, for example in Jerusalem in 2033. We still have a few years to prepare for it.”
 
2033, precisely. This is the next strategic step in the journey imagined and planned by the ecumenical movement at large. Nicaea 2025 was only the rehearsal in preparation for Jerusalem 2033. The great evocative power of the celebration of the 2000th anniversary of Christ’s Resurrection and Pentecost will be put at the service of what could be the ecumenical movement’s final coup: having representatives of all Christian bodies gathered by and around the Roman Pontiff all celebrating their “unity” and having spiritually and theologically “reconciled” relationships.
 
The kind of unity that will be promoted in 2033 will also involve some kind of recognition of the global and transversal (albeit differentiated) role of the Roman Pope for all denominations and boides on the basis of a theology that considers the “solas” of the Protestant Reformation to be definitively overcome.
 
For those who participate in the initiatives planned for 2033, it will no longer be “Scripture Alone,” but Scripture elastically understood as to include tradition, even those traditions which run contrary to the biblical message (e.g. the Marian dogmas, the “imperial” papacy). No longer “Faith Alone,” but faith that is not sufficient to receive the gift of salvation and needs to be supplemented by human works and the sacraments administered by the church. No longer “Christ Alone,” but a Christ who is inclusive of the mediations of Mary and the saints and perhaps of other religious figures. All of this will be included in this version of ecumenically pacified but biblically deviant Christianity.

All these departures from the biblical “solas” of the Protestant Reformation mean that the unity that is going to be promoted in the ecumenical initiatives in 2033, as humanly attractive as they are, will be turns to “a different gospel” (Galatians 1:6-9) that was given “once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 3).

For sure, for Evangelical Christians the year 2033 will be an opportunity to celebrate the gospel truths of Christ’s passion, death, resurrection and ascension, plus the pouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Amen.
 
However, ecumenical celebrations of the same events will not be neutral and at no cost for evangelical fidelity. More than how 2025 has been, 2033 will be the “Omega Point”, i.e the goal of the Ecumenical Movement: all Christians (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, …) will be finally united and seen by the world as “One”. Will it be the unity the Lord Jesus prayed for in John 17? Hardly so. Rather, it will be a decisive point scored for the absorption project that Roman Catholicism has been pursuing for centuries, i.e. integrating different bodies, leaders and beliefs under its umbrella.
 
2033 will be a test for Evangelicals, and the fundamental question will be: can the Evangelical faith be rethought and assimilated within the ecumenical embrace intentionally and primarily prepared by Roman Catholicism?


[1] As it is argued in Mark Gilbert – Leonardo De Chirico (edd.), The Nicene Creed. The Nature of Christian Unity and the Meaning of Gospel Words (Sydney: Matthias Press, 2025).

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250. The Blurred View of “Grace” of Cardinal Fernández

When the Cardinal Prefect of the Vatican Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith (Victor Manuel Fernández, number 3 in the Vatican) writes a book, it is worth paying attention. Cardinal Fernández is also the one who signed “Fiducia supplicans,” allowing the blessing of same-sex unions, and “Mater populi fidelis,” on the use of the Marian title of “co-redemptrix.” In reality, although the book Grazia. Concetti fondamentali per pensare la vita nuova (Grace. Basic Concepts to Think About the New Life) has only just been published in Italian, it dates back to 2003 and was updated in 2010. It was therefore written before he took up his current position as the “guardian” of Roman Catholic doctrine. The theme of grace makes it appealing to the evangelical reader, given the doctrine’s central position in Roman Catholic and Protestant theology.
 
The author’s intention is not to cover the entire doctrine on grace, but to touch on some fundamental concepts, as the subtitle indicates. The three main interlocutors considered in the discussion are Scripture, the medieval pair of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, and the German Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner.
 
Grace as Interpersonal Relationship
The author begins by arguing that grace, biblically speaking, can manifest itself “only in an interpersonal relationship” (14). In the encounter between people, it is the triune God himself who communicates with our lives (uncreated grace) and brings about effects and consequences (created grace: regeneration, liberation, transformation).
 
To this understanding of grace, the Roman Church has preferred other contents, making it more of a “thing” to be dispensed, deserved, and administered. Within the relational conception of grace, the author emphasizes grace as friendship with God, rather than sonship (33). Here, the sacramental categories typical of Roman Catholicism immediately come into play: at baptism, grace is received in order to be “children of God,” but friendship with God depends on sanctifying grace, which is incremental (38-39).
 
Within the realm of relationships, even a “non-Christian” can live in a state of grace (44): when one lives in friendship with others, one experiences grace. It is immediately clear that this relational-sacramental understanding of grace lacks the covenantal and juridical categories proper to Scripture. On the one hand, the sacramental framework of Tridentine Catholicism is reiterated, while on the other hand, the relational emphasis of the contemporary Catholic embracement is affirmed. This Roman Catholic expansion lacks the covenantal criteria of grace, i.e., we receive grace by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.
 
In other words, for the author, God grants us grace by wanting us to be his “friends,” but he fails to say that he does so by not imputing our sins to us, since our Substitute, Jesus, has taken them upon himself. God is a covenant God, and this covenant is broken because of sin and can only be reconciled through the vicarious work of Christ. Biblically speaking, adoption, sonship, and fellowship with God are grounded in justification.

Reinterpreting Augustine
In his discussion, the author oscillates between harsh judgments against Protestantism and ecumenical attitudes. Among the former are the accusations of having conceived grace in such a “particularistic” way as to give rise to a “rotten subjectivism” (quoting J.I. Gonzales Faus, 89) and capitalism. Among the latter is the recognition of God’s gratuitous initiative that precedes any moral action on our part (119).
 
The author’s treatment of Augustine is interesting. The thinking of the “Father of grace” requires “revision” because it has reached “unacceptable extremes” and “exaggerations” that have been harmful (131, 137). The author seems to understand the reasons of the “semi-Pelagians” who proposed a “middle way” between Augustine and Pelagius (134ff). In fact, even if the Cardinal does not say so explicitly, Roman Catholic theology is closer to semi-Pelagianism than to Augustine. In line with the Council of Orange, the Council of Trent moves with “caution” and teaches that God inspires us first, but human cooperation is necessary (139). In explaining how, the author reverses the terms and shows how Roman Catholicism, in calling itself moderately Augustinian, is actually closer to semi-Pelagianism: in fact, God always acts with respect for our fragility (144), in a “resistible” way (151), and starting from human freedom (146, 150), with the exception of Mary, who had “impeccable freedom” (144)!
 
It is then understandable how convoluted the Roman Catholic doctrine of grace is: in words, it is Augustinian. In fact, it is far from Augustine, with an addition of Mariological exceptionalism. Within this complex and convoluted vision, baptism is seen as a sacrament that frees us from original sin and disposes us to justification (163). Yet the sacraments are not the only way to grace (162). Traditional sacramentalism is reaffirmed, but open to the universalist demands of contemporary Roman Catholicism.
 
Clumsy Justification
When it comes to justification, the conceptual difficulty that pervades the book emerges even more clearly. Without any biblical support, justification is understood as “the very fact of being a friend of God” (178). Instead of accepting the legal categories of Scripture, friendly categories are preferred, which are not proper to justification. In addition, two modes of God’s action (transforming and impelling) are associated with justification. First, it is said that grace precedes works, but then it is also argued, with Thomas, that one can dispose oneself to justification by giving consent (197). This cooperation is of “variable intensity” (198) or “different intensity” (200). In short, without the forensic framework of Scripture, justification is sometimes thought of as friendship, sometimes as a gift, and sometimes as something to be prepared for through one’s own cooperation.
 
The final theses proposed by the author are a theological potpourri (243-245). In a nutshell, Roman Catholic justification brings together all the complexity of the layered tradition of Catholicism: a little of Augustine but without the gravity of sin, a little of semi-Pelagianism that emphasizes our ability to collaborate, the subtle distinctions of Thomas Aquinas, the sacramentalism of Trent, the catholicity of Vatican II whereby even non-Christians can be justified (223).
 
One of the last chapters deals with the Roman Catholic-Lutheran dialogue on justification. The interpretation offered by the author is in line with the mainstream ecumenical view: the two views (Catholic and Lutheran) are “two aspects of the same truth” (208) that use “different expressions” (209) to refer to the same reality interpreted in the light of different concerns. In light of the 1999 Joint Declaration, anathemas have become “salutary warnings” that no longer apply (211). As for other religions, given the absence of forensic categories, justification can be accessible in various degrees of fullness (224-225): only the Roman Catholic sacraments guarantee the greatest fullness.
 
In the end, the author’s thinking on the subject is summarized as follows: “God is present in every human being from the moment of conception, not only as Creator, but also as Savior” (235). This is the catholicity of grace in contemporary Roman Catholicism. Without the legal/covenantal understanding, one slips into the universalism of salvation.
 
The book introduces us to the universe of contemporary Roman Catholic theology of grace, in which everything can be found except a firm commitment to respect the biblical teaching that “by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not from yourselves; it is the gift of God” (Ephesians 2:8).

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