244. The Puzzle of Pope Leo XIV. Towards a Geopolitics of the New Papacy

It is still too early to get an idea of ​​what Leo XIV’s papacy will be like. Only now are the first biographies starting to come out (e.g. Matthew Bunsun, Leo XIV. Portrait of the First American Pope, 2025; Christopher White, Pope Leo XIV. Inside the Conclave and the Dawn of a New Papacy, 2025; Antonio Preziosi, Leone XIV. La via disarmata e disarmante, 2025), generally with a hagiographic or journalistic tone. While Pope Prevost takes his first steps, many are starting to ask what his main directions and priorities will be.

For now, it is possible to move by clues and traces that need to be collected and interpreted. On the geopolitical front, the magazine Limes has tried to draw a conceptual map for what lies ahead for Pope Leo. The Roman Catholic Church, with the Vatican at its center, is also a player on the global chessboard; it represents 1.4 billion people (18% of the world’s population), has diplomatic relations with most countries, and has a say in the main documentation of global politics. It is not surprising that a geopolitical magazine dedicated an entire issue to it: The Puzzle of Pope Leo, Limes (5/2025).

The starting point is precisely the choice of the word “puzzle,” i.e. a picture to be guessed from the few available elements. Here are some suggestions from the various articles, many coming from political scientists, journalists, and (a few) theologians of moderate progressive culture, with the exception of R. Reno, editor of the conservative American magazine First Things.

First, the person of the pope is bearer of unusual traits: a “Latin Yankee,” a “Pan-American” man, a Euro-American, a personality with a “hybrid” cultural identity and a calm and determined character. A “lion” among other global lions (e.g. Trump, Putin, Xi Jinping). A son of the Fourth Rome (the USA) on the throne of the First Rome in a world where overall balances are being redefined in the presence of wars and threats of war. The initial impression is that, after the geopolitical shuffling of cards by Francis (who appeared hostile to Ukraine and Israel, subject of China, and emotionally distant from the US and Europe), Leo brings the boat of Peter to sail in the direction of the Atlanticism that was of John Paul II, slender towards the West and skeptical about the still “far” East (e.g. China). It is true that there would have been no Leo XIV without Francis, but the current pope is not a replica of the previous in the geopolitical positioning of the Church of Rome.

The choice of the name Leo is another clue that many observers focus on. Leo XIII, the predecessor in choosing the name, wrote the encyclical “Rerum Novarum” (1891), which opened the Catholic Church to the social question and living conditions of workers. Leo XIII inaugurated the era of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church. The analysts of Limes read in Prevost’s choice to call himself Leo the commitment to address the social issue par excellence of this generation: artificial intelligence (AI). There are already signs in this direction, but many expect an encyclical (i.e. the highest authoritative document by a Pope) dedicated to AI, believing that the Roman Catholic Church is the only global moral agency able to subvert the exclusive interests of the war industry and the techno-globalist powers.

Another piece of the Leo puzzle is its relationship with the USA and North American Catholicism. As is well known, Francis was not loved by a consistent part of American Catholics, and financial support for Rome’s budget has decreased significantly over the years, also due to American disaffection with Pope Francis. Now, Leo is asked to sew up the tear and restart the donations that the Catholic Church desperately needs for its bleeding budgets. Then there is the relationship with the US Administration, especially with the “catholic” vice president, J.D. Vance, who interprets a conservative Catholicism but is not exactly deferential towards ecclesiastical authorities. Soon after his election, there has been no lack of opportunities for polemics between Vance and the Vatican on migration policy and also on the interpretation of the ordo amoris, i.e. the differentiated responsibilities of Roman Catholic action. Leo XIV faces the challenge of resetting and re-establishing relationships, keeping together the legacy of Francis and the American Catholic system.

A final consideration needs to address the relationship with Protestantism, although limited to the US context. Many of the geopolitical issues at stake involve “ecumenical” relations with the Orthodox patriarchates of Moscow and Kiev, or inter-religious relations such as those with the Jewish world. But what about Protestantism? Many observers (by the way, all Catholic, some practicing, most nominal) note the state of “crisis” of American Protestantism: polarized, jagged, angry, flattened with or against Trump, under the shadow cone of politics rather than living in its own light. The crisis also has to do with the nationalist culture that, for them, is a child of Protestant individualism. In their view, in the fractured context of North American society, Catholic communitarianism (i.e. the Catholic insistence that human life is life-in-community in the context of the Catholic Church) would be better equipped than Protestant individualism to offer a prospect not only of economic wealth but also of social welfare. In this sense, “Rome alone” would be able to build a third way between the woke culture of the left and the nationalism of individualistic conservatism. There is an expectation that Pope Leo will be able to exert an attraction from Protestantism towards Roman Catholicism in American society. Evangelicals should be aware of these trends and consider Rome as a spiritual competitor rather than an ally, due to her different account of the gospel from the biblical one.

These analyses are not theological and do not grasp central elements of the papacy as an ecclesiastical institution which is based on doctrinal commitments. In this sense, they only grasp the “political” side of Rome but not her theological vision. However, they can help start to put together the pieces of the beginning of this pontificate puzzle.

Share Button

243. The Bishop of Rome. What is the Future of the Papacy?

The recent death of Pope Francis and the subsequent election of Leo XIV to the papal throne have reignited media interest in the papacy. Beyond the attention given to the personalities of individual Popes, what is the office of the Pope? What are his prerogatives according to the Roman Catholic Church? How does this institution fit into the global world and in the ecumenical relationships outside of Rome?

These questions are all considered in the newly released study document by the Vatican Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity: “The Bishop of Rome. Primacy and Sinodality in the Ecumenical Dialogues and in the Responses to the Encyclical Ut Unum Sint” (2024; henceforth BoR). The 170 page text surveys the ongoing ecumenical dialogue concerning the role of the Pope and the exercise of the Petrine Ministry. Its remote context is the invitation made by Pope John Paul II exactly thirty years ago. In fact, in his 1995 encyclical “Ut Unum Sint,” the then Pope asked Church leaders and theologians “to find a way of exercising the primacy which, while in no way renouncing what is essential to its mission, is nonetheless open to a new situation” (n. 95).

On the one hand, in John Paul II’s view, the papacy was to be maintained in its essentials; on the other, it was presented as open and willing to rethink itself in fresh and accepted ways. Almost twenty years later, Francis spoke of his desire to see a “pastoral conversion” of the papacy (The Joy of the Gospel, 2013, n. 32) that would make it at the service of the whole of Christianity, indeed the whole world. Among other things, his insistence on referring to himself as “the Bishop of Rome,” rather than with other titles claiming universal authority, was a way to encourage such a process of acceptance.

The document brings together the fruits of the ecumenical dialogues on the ministry of the Pope in response to the invitation by John Paul II. It is not a synthesis of Roman Catholic teaching on the papacy, but rather a summary of the discussion generated by Ut Unun Sint, as expressed in 30 official responses and 50 documents that reference it. Its goal is to seek a form of the exercise of the papacy that is shared by all churches that participate in the ecumenical movement with the Roman Catholic Church, e.g. Eastern Orthodox, Oriental, Anglican, and historic Protestant.

BoR provides a state-of-the-art document where one can find important indications of the evolution of the papacy, with some insights on possible future outlooks. Here are some interesting findings.[1]

Infallibility?
Since its definition, the 1870 Roman Catholic dogma of papal infallibility has been a stumbling block between Rome and the other churches, on both sides of the East-West divide. As it was formulated then, this prerogative of the Pope simply could not be accepted by non-Catholics. However, BR suggests a way forward.
 
As far as the hermeneutics of Vatican I is concerned, it has become an accepted ecumenical principle to interpret it in the light of Vatican II (nn. 61 and 66) and therefore placing infallibility in the wider context of Vatican II ecclesiology. The latter stressed the collegiality of bishops (the Pope being one of them and never to be considered in isolation from them) and recognized a more active role for the laity in the life of the church. Vatican II’s ecclesiology underlines “communion” and considers the Pope as part of it. The infallibility promulgated at Vatican I should be “re-received” (n. 145), i.e. re-interpreted, against the background of Vatican II.
 
Then, BoR distinguishes between the text of the dogma of infallibility and its intention. The former may seem overly juridical and authoritarian, but the intention was to protect and serve the indefectibility of the whole Church (n. 70). This is a concern that can be shared by all ecumenical Christians. If Vatican I can be interpreted in this way, even non-Catholics may be prepared “to acknowledge papacy as a legitimate expression of the Petrine ministry of unity” (n. 73).
 
A Ministry of Unity in A Reunited Church
“Is a primacy for the whole Church necessary?” is the question that opens paragraph 75. Many ecumenical dialogues have recognized the need for it for three reasons.
 
First, the apostolic tradition. From the 4th century and definitely so from the 7th century, the See of Rome was considered “the first in the hierarchy” (n. 76), although, as already noted in an earlier section, this primacy is due to political reasons and not biblical ones. Rome was the capital of the empire, and the bishop of Rome began to be seen as presiding over the others because of the importance of the city of Rome in the Roman Empire (n. 78).
 
Second, the ecclesiological argument. For those churches that have an episcopalian form of government (i.e. led by a bishop), it is obvious that what happens at the local level should happen at the universal level. In other words, if a bishop is given authority over a local diocese, it is appropriate that the world as a whole has a bishop ruling over it.
 
Third, a pragmatic argument. Many churches readily admit “the need for global instruments of communion” (n. 84) that are capable of resolving conflicts between local churches and representing them before the global world. Some dialogues have also argued that the ministry of unity granted by the papal office would also serve a reinvigorated, common mission (n. 86).
 
Looking back at the history of the development of the papacy, BoR recalls what Joseph Ratzinger wrote in 1982, i.e. “Rome must not require more of the East than was formulated and lived during the first millennium” (n. 91). This is in line with John Paul II’s openness to change without altering the essentials of the papacy. Moreover, in the first millennium, “communion” was lived out in primarily informal ways, rather than being carried out within “clear structures” (n. 93). The authority of the Roman Pope was mainly characterized by a “primacy of honour” (n. 94).
 
How to overcome the gap between the primacy of honour (ecumenically acceptable by the East) and the primacy of jurisdiction (as it was developed in the second millennium by the Roman Catholic Church) remains an open question (n. 98). The way forward is to see how the “communal” (all,i.e. Christians), collegial (some, i.e. the bishops) and personal (one, i.e. the Pope) dimensions of church life interplay (n. 116) and find ways that are compatible with the different traditions. What BoR bears witness to is the reality that all ecumenical partners are willing to engage the issue constructively.

Three Key Steps for the Ecumenical Future of the Papacy
After surveying the main contents of BoR, it is time to look at the document within the broader context of the present-day ecumenical setting and to try to become acquainted with its theological narrative. According to the fruits of the ecumenical dialogue gathered in the document, the Papacy will have a future as a world-wide, religious institution at the service of the reunited Church. None of the ecumenical partners questions this prospect. It is a matter of how and when, not if and why. Gone are the times when, from both East and West, the Roman Catholic Papacy was seen as a non-biblical, insurmountable stumbling block that needed to be removed. It seems that if one wants to be “ecumenical” today, she needs to come to terms with a slightly modified Papacy in terms of its attitudes and titles, but with no change as far as the theological substance is concerned.
 
In order to appraise what is at stake, one needs to appreciate the trajectory that the Roman Catholic Church has been able to influence over the last 60 years since the Second Ecumenical Council (1962-1965). Here are three important steps that have given shape to the ecumenical framework behind BoR:

1. “Complementary,” no longer “conflicting”
It was the 1964 Vatican II document on ecumenism that said: “these various theological expressions (e.g. those of the Eastern churches) are to be considered often as mutually complementary rather than conflicting” (Vatican II, Unitatis Redintegratio, 1964, n. 17). The principle of complementarity and compatibility was extended to all doctrinal matters. Ecumenical theology sees all differences as belonging to the same reality that is accessible from various angles and interpreted as mutually enriching rather than mutually exclusive. This has become the premise of present-day ecumenism.

Among other things, this means that the evangelical recovery of the gospel captured in the “Christ alone,” “Scripture alone,” and “Faith alone” of the Protestant Reformation is now seen as an “emphasis” to be integrated in the Roman Catholic whole, rather expressing the Christian faith in opposition to the Roman Catholic flawed account of the gospel. The papacy is no longer seen as an institution at the center of a theological conflict, but as an essential part of the Church, in which complementary views are possible and accepted.

2. From “differentiated consensus” to “differentiated exercise”
In 1999, the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation signed the “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification” (JDDJ), one of the dividing doctrines in the 16th century. JDDJ claims that the document “encompasses a consensus in the basic truths; the differing explications in particular statements are compatible with it” (JDDJ, n. 14). This approach was later defined as “differentiated consensus”: Catholics and Lutherans can agree on the basics of justification and maintain their respective emphases as compatibile. The “differentiated consensus” was later used to foster ecumenical dialogue that would consider doctrines as made of modular units (some of which people can agree upon while disagreeing on others), instead of treating them as aspects of an integrated whole.

Now, BoR shows that the same approach is extended to the Papacy. It involves a “differentiated exercise of the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome” (n. 150), spanning from full jurisdiction (the Roman Catholic Church), to “primacy of honour” (Anglican, Oriental and Orthodox churches), to a global leadership role (historic Protestant churches). Ecumenical partners will have the possibility of accessing a “differentiated exercise” of it, picking the aspects they like and leaving aside those they are less happy with. The Papacy will remain for all, although it may look somewhat different from its Roman-second millennium outlook and perhaps closer to its first millennium shape.

3. Open to change, not renouncing the Roman Catholic “essentials”
Now we can see that the invitation given by John Paul II in 1995 was not out of context; on the contrary, it was a reflection of the ecumenical mindset already affirmed at Vatican II and a further development of it. The rules of the game suggested by John Paul II (i.e. open to minor changes, carrying on the essentials) were accepted and are now considered as the shared consensus of the ecumenical movement.
 
BoR stands on the shoulders of the post-Vatican II attempts made by Rome to call all Christians to be united, overcoming past divisions, seeing all traditions as complementary, and building this unity on differentiated consensus. The other side of the coin is that Rome will at the same time stick to the “essentials” as they are embedded in its doctrinal system – the Papacy being one of them.
 
The ecumenical unity envisaged by BoR will have the Roman Pope at the center: in a sense, the Roman Catholic business as usual, now updated and conformed to the ecumenical age. BoR is the latest example of the Catholic absorption of different ideas and former opponents, provided they accept that Rome will not change its foundational theological committments that are outside or against biblical teaching, and will instead further expand its synthesis that goes beyond gospel boundaries. Biblical Christianity is not an appeased sub-section of Roman Catholicism but a gospel alternative to a system that is not grounded on Scripture Alone as its ultimate authority and on Faith Alone as to how salvation is to be received. 


[1] Reference to sections of the document will appear in parentheses.

Share Button